When war broke out after the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, troops were almost immediately mobilized and sent from the northern states along the coast to protect Washington, D.C.
The most efficient mode of transportation was the railroad. Troops traveled south through Philadelphia and into Baltimore, where they were expected to transfer between rail lines and continue toward the capital. But Baltimore quickly became a flashpoint.
On April 19, 1861, as Union troops passed through the city, they were met with angry southern sympathizers. What followed was not a minor disturbance—it was organized resistance that turned into violence. The railroad from Philadelphia did not connect directly to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Camden Station, so troops had to be transported a short distance across the city.
That transfer became the problem.
Obstructions were placed in the streets by protestors, preventing the rail cars from being drawn by horses. As a result, the troops were forced to disembark and march through Baltimore to reach Camden Station. It was during this movement that violence erupted.
The confrontation resulted in casualties among Union troops—generally recorded as four killed and dozens wounded—along with attacks on railroad infrastructure and additional assaults on unarmed troops arriving from Philadelphia. The situation escalated quickly, and control of the city became uncertain.
Maryland itself was divided.
Howard County had two divisions of cavalry sanctioned by the state government—one commanded by Capt. George R. Gaither, known as the Dragoons, and the other by Capt. W. H. Dorsey. These units were reported to have between 75 and 100 men each (Jones, Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 5, p. 251).
According to that account:
“When the indignation of the citizens of Baltimore burst forth… the Howard County Dragoons immediately assembled at Ellicott’s Mills, and on the next day marched into the city and placed themselves under the command of General G. H. Steuart.” (Jones, 1878)
General George H. Steuart, a Baltimore native, had resigned his U.S. Army commission and aligned himself with the Confederacy. He would later rise to the rank of Brigadier General. At this early stage, however, his role—and that of local units like the Howard Dragoons—was tied directly to events unfolding in Baltimore.
Their presence has been described as protective of the city from what were viewed as northern “invaders,” and in the days that followed they were involved in monitoring Union movements and identifying suspected Union sympathizers.
At the same time, Union leadership viewed the situation very differently.
General Benjamin F. Butler, writing in April 1861, described local armed groups in Maryland as hostile to federal authority and questioned whether they should be arrested or detained to secure the region (Butler correspondence, April 1861).
Within two days of the riot, telegraph poles were taken down by the mob, and communication with Washington was cut off. The capital was now isolated—limited communication, limited troop presence, and uncertain control of the surrounding region.
Maryland Governor Thomas Hicks, recognizing the danger, decided not to allow additional Union troops to pass through Baltimore. That decision effectively closed the primary rail route to Washington.
The federal government was in a difficult position. With relatively few troops protecting the capital, and no reliable way to move reinforcements through Baltimore, the situation became urgent.
It was not until April 25, 1861, that Union troops finally arrived in Washington in force, marching down Pennsylvania Avenue.
In the meantime, a new strategy had to be developed.
Circumventing Baltimore
With Baltimore no longer a viable route, the President directed that troops be sent by alternative means.
Some units were transported from Harrisburg down the Susquehanna River to the port of Annapolis. Others traveled down the Delaware River and through the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, also arriving at Annapolis.
From there, they were placed on the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad and transported to Annapolis Junction.
This is where the Junction’s importance becomes clear.
At Annapolis Junction, troops could:
Transfer to the B&O Washington Branch
Move west toward Relay, Elkridge Landing, and Ellicott’s Mills
Or remain to guard the rail infrastructure itself
According to Jack Bowen (Laurel History Boys), regiments such as the 10th Maine Infantry, followed by the 109th New York Volunteer Infantry, were among the first to come down from the north using this route to guard the railroad.
This was happening almost immediately.
It took less than two weeks from the attack on Fort Sumter for troops to begin arriving at Annapolis Junction as part of this redirected movement.
At the same time, Confederate forces under Thomas J. Jackson began targeting railroad bridges and operations along the B&O to the west, further emphasizing the vulnerability of the system.
As a result, Union troops were assigned not just to move through the Junction, but to protect it.
Annapolis Junction Becomes a Military Site
“The Military Operations at Annapolis Junction, MD 1861–1865” documents the arrival and stationing of various troops at the Junction beginning in the spring of 1861.
The transformation was rapid.
What had been a small depot with a couple of hotels and a post office became:
A transfer point for troop movement
A staging area for operations
A defensive position protecting the rail lines
It was reported that the Fitzsimmons Hotel, located closest to the campgrounds on the east side of the tracks, served as headquarters and an armory for the troops.
At the same time, federal troops effectively took control of the B&O line between Washington and Annapolis Junction. The railroad continued to operate, but under military necessity.
Trains from Camden Station in Baltimore would carry passengers to Annapolis Junction, where they would disembark and transfer to government-controlled trains for the final leg toward Washington.
This arrangement underscores the importance of the Junction.
It was not just a stop along the line.
It had become a controlled point—where civilian transportation, military movement, and federal authority intersected.
Why This Matters
It is easy to overlook Annapolis Junction because so little remains.
But in April and May of 1861, it played a role in a much larger story:
The breakdown of transportation through Baltimore
The isolation of Washington at the outset of the war
The rapid development of alternative supply and troop routes
The militarization of key points along the railroad
Annapolis Junction was one of those points.
And for a brief period, it was essential to the Union’s ability to respond to the crisis.
Research in Progress: This summary provides only high-level background. Full documentation and primary-source analysis will be published in Lost Howard County (2027). Please do not reuse or republish this research without permission.
The Baltimore Sun, Saturday April 20, 1861
The Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, Maryland) · Sat, Apr 27, 1861